Secured Architecture for Unmanned Surface Vehicle Fleets Management and Control by MERINO LASO, Pedro et al.
Science Arts & Métiers (SAM)
is an open access repository that collects the work of Arts et Métiers ParisTech
researchers and makes it freely available over the web where possible.
This is an author-deposited version published in: https://sam.ensam.eu
Handle ID: .http://hdl.handle.net/10985/15040
To cite this version :
Pedro MERINO LASO, David BROSSET, Marie-Annick GIRAUD - Secured Architecture for
Unmanned Surface Vehicle Fleets Management and Control - In: 2018 IEEE 16th Intl Conf on
Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing, 16th Intl Conf on Pervasive Intelligence and
Computing, 4th Intl Conf on Big Data Intelligence and Computing and Cyber Science and
Technology Congress(DASC/PiCom/DataCom/CyberSciTech), Grèce, 2018-08 - 2018 IEEE 16th
Intl Conf on Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing, 16th Intl Conf on Pervasive
Intelligence and Computing, 4th Intl Conf on Big Data Intelligence and Computing and Cyber
Science and Technology Congress(DASC/PiCom/DataCom/CyberSciTech) - 2018
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the repository
Administrator : archiveouverte@ensam.eu
Secured Architecture for Unmanned Surface Vehicle
Fleets Management and Control
Pedro Merino Laso
French Maritime Academy (ENSM)
38, rue Gabriel Pe´ri BP 90303
44103 Nantes Cedex 04, France
pedro.merino-laso@supmaritime.fr
David Brosset
Naval Academy Research Institute
Ecole navale - CC 600 F29240
Brest Cedex 9, France
david.brosset@ecole-navale.fr
Marie-Annick Giraud
SOFRESUD
777 Avenue de Bruxelles
83500 La Seyne sur Mer, France
marie-annick.giraud@sofresud.com
Abstract—Cyber-physical systems contribute to building new
infrastructure in the modern world. These systems help realize
missions reducing costs and risks. The seas being a harsh
and dangerous environment are a perfect application of them.
Unmanned Surface vehicles (USV) allow realizing normal and
new tasks reducing risk and cost i.e. surveillance, water cleaning,
environmental monitoring or search and rescue operations. Also,
as they are unmanned vehicles they can extend missions to
unpleasing and risky weather conditions. The novelty of these
systems makes that new command and control platforms need
to be developed. In this paper, we describe an implemented
architecture with 5 separated levels. This structure increases
security by defining roles and by limiting information exchanges.
Index Terms—USV, cyber-physical systems, SCADA, security,
control system
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, maritime transportation is the preferred mean of
transport for most of merchandise. In the European Union,
76.1% of transported goods is made by seas, which represents
50.6% of the value of its trade [1]. However, aerial trans-
portation is preferred for merchandizes with high value/weight
ratio. But there exist other important maritime assets like en-
ergy, communication and fishing. Ships, ports communication
systems and different types of buildings compose the needed
infrastructure to accomplish these goals.
All these structures represent an important, strategic and
economic value. A failure or a successful attack would have
vital implications caused by dysfunctions of i.e. water supply,
public health and energy. For this reason, they are often
considered as critical infrastructure.
Particularly, the seas are a harsh environment where the laws
are sometimes not respected. Nowadays, pirate attacks repre-
sent an actual risk of naval security that implies these assets
and crew members. Environmental disasters also need partic-
ular attention. Cyber-physical systems are used in SCADA
systems to control and survey procedures, which extends the
attack surface to cyberspace. SCADA systems can be inte-
grated in Unmanned Vehicles (UV) to automatize dangerous
tasks.
The project Sea4M, coordinated by SOFRESUD, is supported by the French
Environment & Energy Management Agency (ADEME) in the frame of the
Future Investments Programme.
The particularities of UV make that new architectures need
to be developed. Sea4M [2] project looks for building a whole
architecture of command and control of heterogeneous Un-
manned Surface Vehicles (USV) with multi-mission purposes.
This architecture needs to be capable of coordinating coop-
erative missions of semi-autonomous vessels where multiple
roles need to be considered in decision-making and control
processes.
The paper is organized as follows. First, a short related
work section introduces some research about the security of
drones and SCADA systems. The third section presents the
new developed architecture. This architecture is based on five
different levels. Section 4 explains main security measures.
Finally, a conclusion lists the main benefits of the architecture
and gives some perspectives.
II. RELATED WORK
In many cases, autonomous systems are the best option to
use to supervise and control sensitive systems. To survey and
protect these assets, multiple systems are deployed as aerial
drones (UAV), unmanned surface vehicles (USV) and SCADA
systems. All these protection systems also become critical if
they aim to protect critical infrastructure.
USV are nowadays an important field of research due to its
low cost and wide applications [3]. Typical examples of their
applications are environmental monitoring [4], surveillance [5]
and underwater mapping [6].
Sometimes, novelty USV projects reuse existing control
software for other unmanned vehicles as UAV [7]. In this
case the chosen solution was Monitor Planner, that allows
a fast developing of a global solution. However, maritime
navigation has different characteristics and uses different in-
formation sources. For example, waves can block camera
views and pilots use a compass and radar to compensate this
disadvantage. There also exists adapted solutions to control
semi-autonomous USV [8]. All considerations for maritime
navigation have been taken into account. On the other hand,
these systems do not consider different roles and tasks that
exist in reality. That is, their focus is on control software
without paying attention to commandment chain.
SCADA systems that equipped UV can also be vulnerable.
The security of these systems is more and more addressed
by the scientific community because of their presence in
numerous critical systems. The studies concern both anomaly
detection and security properties modelling [9]–[11].
III. PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE
In Sea4M project, we have chosen to conceive an archi-
tecture with five separate levels. ISA-95 industrial standard
has inspired this approach [12]. This standard defines abstract
levels going from 0 to 4 with different objectives.
Each level has a particular role which allows isolating tasks
to increase security. Thin communications are needed between
these levels but they can be easily protected due to this size
and known structure. Other measures such as encryption and
whitelisting will be used. Also, most of interchanged informa-
tion does not involve confidentiality risks because it concerns
public data i.e. AIS positions and RADAR detections.
Fig. 1 shows the defined levels: USVs, exploitation centre,
operational centre and management. Centres are physically
isolated increasing security and flexibility.
Fig. 1. Architecture schema with levels.
A. Level 4: Management
Management plan strategies and fix objectives. For that, they
handle budgets and company resources to achieve them. In
our application, they define the engaged means (people and
USVs), objectives and priorities.
B. Level 3: Operational Centre
Operational centre receives orders and limitations from
management centre. Centre plans specific missions based on
this information. To specify the details of the mission they
have an overview of the whole fleet of USV and external
information as port data. Also, they have access to real-time
data from the exploitation region that is observed by AIS and
RADAR systems installed in different observation points.
Finally, they assign missions to exploitation centres. Due
to isolation between centres to prevent security risks, level 3
should also coordinate operations if a mission engages more
than one of those centres.
Another important mission is to survey that exploitation
centres realize the assigned tasks as planned. That is necessary
because they usually adapt missions during their execution in
order to adapt them to variable conditions.
C. Level 2: Exploitation Centre
Exploitation centres monitor and perform missions de-
scribed by operational centre. As USVs are semi-autonomous,
in practice they monitor the vessels and for instances, they
take control in difficult circumstances. They also monitor the
state of the system to detect maintenance needs or problems
that can impact on the mission. Each exploitation centre has
an assigned fleet that cannot be controlled and monitored by
other centres.
D. Level 1: SCADA (Automatism and Sensors)
SCADA systems comprise all systems that allow com-
municating, controlling and monitoring USVs. That is, the
exploitation centre equipment that send and receive commands
from USVs and inboard USV systems. Three groups of
subsystems are included in this level: automatisms, sensors
and communication systems. Among the most used sensors
there are RADAR systems, GPS and LIDAR while the most
common automatisms are the rudder and the motor. As USVs
are heterogeneous, several embedded equipments are present
in each vessel i.e. adapted rescue materials.
E. Level 0: Physic
Even though whole system has hardware components to
simplify, we only consider USVs as physical part of the system
because it is the part that interacts with physical world. So,
all the embedded systems listed in previous subsection are
considered at this level when they are seeing as material
components.
IV. SECURITY MEASURES
To secure the platform, different measures have been taken
into account. Mainly, this protection consists of role-based
tasks, physical and network isolation, secured connections and
limitations on communications.
First, each level has defined roles as described in previous
section. No other level can accomplish different tasks that
those assigned. That is, level 4 communicates available means
and objectives to be accomplished to level 3. Level 3 plans
specific missions based on this limitations and order to level
2 to realize them. Level 2 monitor and control drones thanks
to the sensors and actuators present on the USVs.
Second, each level and centre are physically distant. This
isolation allows implementing resilient measures i.e. backup
centre if first one is impacted. Also, computer networks are
isolated to prevent intrusions.
Third, only verified systems can belong to the system thanks
to whitelisting protection. Also, encrypted communications are
preferred in all exchanges. When that is not possible i.e. phone
calls between levels 3 and 4, authentication protocols are used.
Finally, information exchanges are limited. Only two con-
nected levels can communicate. To avoid espionage and at-
tacks propagation, if multiple centres exist on the same level
they can’t send information between them. Also exchanged
information are limited to the interests of each level i.e. level
4 receive a report of realized mission but it cannot visualize
operation data as USV position.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have presented the architecture of a novel
system to control and manage USV fleets. Naval missions
engage heterogeneous systems with a specific commandment
chain. As USV operating processes are vulnerable in different
manners, the implemented solution gives a vital importance to
security.
Sea4M project has developed this architecture based on
security by design principles. Five different levels allow sep-
arating systems, roles and tasks. Each level realizes limited
operations with thin connections with other levels. Also,
each level applies specific security measures chosen for its
particularities.
Future works concern the development of an adapted Hu-
man Computer Interface (HCI) and a validation experiment
in real context and missions. Also, a further security analysis
will be performed for specific equipment and technologies.
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